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Firm turnover (i.e. firm entry and exit) is a well-recognized source of sectorlevel 
productivity growth across developing and developed countries. In contrast, the role and 
importance of firms switching activities from one sector to another is little understood. 
Firm switchers are likely to be unique both from newly established entrants and exiting 
firms that close down. We build an empirical model that examines switching behaviour 
based on data from Vietnamese manufacturing firms during the period 2001–08. Our 
diagnostic shows that switching firms have different characteristics and behaviour as 
compared to entry and exit firms. They tend, inter alia, to be labour-intensive and seek 
out competitive opportunities in labour-intensive sectors in response to changes in the 
market environment. We also show that resource reallocations resulting from switching 
form an important component of productivity growth. 
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In the literature on firm turnover, any firms that leave a particular sector are, with one major 
exception covering US manufacturing plants (Bernard et al., 2006), classified as exit firms.1 
This is so, even if some firms in reality do not close down but switch production to a different 
sector. Similarly, new entrants include both genuinely new firms and firms previously 
operating in other sectors.2 
This is surprising given that switchers are likely to be different both from other firms entering 
and those which exit. Moreover, if sector switchers are more productive than other firms, 
then new entrants may be accredited with contributing to productivity growth to a greater 
extent than they actually do. If switching firms do have different characteristics to ‘real’ entry 
and exit firms and are motivated by different factors, then understanding this dynamic is 
important for understanding the potential effect of changes in the external environment on 
productivity.3  
We present a basic conceptual framework along the lines of Ericson and Pakes (1995), which 
outlines the process through which firms decide to enter, exit or switch sectors. This 
behavioural framework is used to make predictions about the potential drivers of firm 
dynamics, and in particular firm switching behaviour. We consider how firm turnover might 
be affected by the observed characteristics of sectors and exogenous shocks such as 
regulatory changes and trade liberalization and what this might mean for productivity.  
Motivated by our theoretical predictions, we empirically explore the factors associated with 
the type of switching behaviour observed and compare them to those related to entry and exit 
in a case study for Vietnam, using census data for the period 2001–08. We also measure the 
importance of industry dynamics for productivity growth and identify the component of 
productivity growth that is due to the reallocation of activities across broadly defined sectors.  
Accordingly, a core aim of this paper is to diagnose the extent to which differences exist 
between entry, exit, and sector switching firms. We rely on estimations of firm level revenue 
productivity measures for sub-sectors of the manufacturing sector, and use these productivity 
measures to establish the contribution of (i) firm turnover, and (ii) sector switching versus 
‘real’ entry and exit, to productivity growth. Throughout the analysis, particular focus is 
given to the role of trade liberalization and deregulation.4 
                                                 
1  For an overview of this literature see Caves (1998), Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and Tybout (2000). 
2  It may also happen that firms, which change ownership form or location in one year are classified as exit 
firms and as entry firms the next year, see for example Aw et al. (2001). 
3  Another recent area of literature analysing firm dynamics and productivity growth has focused on changes in 
the product mix by surviving firms as the main channel of productivity growth, see for example Bernard et 
al. (2009; 2010), Goldberg et al. (2008) and Eckel and Neary (2006).  
4  A large literature points to a variety of relevant mechanisms through which trade liberalization can impact 
positively on productivity growth, see for example Melitz (2003) and Pavcnik (2002). For analyses of the 
extent to which deregulation induces resource reallocations within an industry see Eslava et al. (2004), Olley 
and Pakes (1996), and Stiroh and Strahan (2003). 
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Section 2 presents the conceptual framework used to organise our empirical model. Section 3 
presents the empirical approach while Section 4 describes the data. Empirical results are put 
forward in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. 
2 Behavioural  framework 
The seminal literature on the evolution of industry and industry dynamics does not consider 
the possibility that firms may choose to reallocate resources into new sectors to maximise 
profits or to avoid exiting the industry. Yet, the general line of thinking in the contributions 
by Dunne et al. (1988; 1989), Jovanovic, (1982), Dixit (1989), Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson 
and Pakes (1995), and Olley and Pakes (1996) can be relied on to predict the probability of a 
firm switching its main production activity. Such extension is a key aim of this paper, and to 
motivate and organise our empirical investigation, we set out a behavioural framework 
departing from Ericson and Pakes (1995).5  
Accordingly, we assume that there are two sectors in an industry and that in each sector there 
are a large number of price-taking firms, facing the same market structure and producing a 
homogenous output. Firms differ both in terms of their productivity ( ) and their 
expectations about future market conditions (Ω), both in their sector and in the other sector in 
the industry. We assume that the objective of each firm is to maximise the expected value of 
current and future profits. Profits ( ) will depend on the firm’s choice of inputs, their 
productivity, and market conditions. 
Firms pay a sunk cost of entry into sector j (   ) and will enter if      |    ≥   .6 Each 
period, a firm decides to exit or switch production to a different sector, before deciding how 
much to invest. Firms continue to produce if the expected value of future profits exceeds the 
termination valuation of the firm (  ). In evaluating future profits the enterprise considers the 
profit that is attainable in its sector (sector j) relative to the profit that could be achieved in 
the alternative sector (sector s).  
The firm will switch to sector s if the expected profits from producing in this sector, less the 
sunk cost of switching (  ), are greater than the expected profits from continuing to produce 
in sector j plus the termination value of the firm, that is      |   ) −    >        |    ≥   . 
Given that switching firms have incurred sunk costs when initially setting up production, we 
expect the sunk costs of switching to a different sector to be less than the sunk cost facing 
new entrants into that sector.7  
                                                 
5  Olley and Pakes (1996) and Pavcnik (2002) use a similar conceptual framework to help inform their 
empirical investigations without deriving a full theoretical model. 
6  A class of models on the evolution of industry assume that prior to commencing production firms are 
unaware of what their individual productivity draw will be but will learn this information upon entry 
(Jovanovic, 1982). Firms will ‘learn-by-doing’ and will improve their productivity and profitability in each 
period. In this way the evolution of the firm and the industry depends on the initial unobserved productivity 
draw. In what follows, we assume that productivity evolves as a first order Markov process, which is 
consistent with this idea. 
7  Switching costs could be interpreted as a depletion of capital stock due to, for example, certain machinery or 
equipment becoming obsolete. Investment in new machinery or equipment, however, would be considered 
an investment that adds to the firm’s capital stock.  
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Firms may also face a shock to productivity as a result of switching activities which they will 
take into account in making their decision. Profit will depend not only on the firm’s 
productivity relative to other firms in the sector, but also on market conditions in that sector. 
We assume that market conditions are not fully observed by the firm but are anticipated with 
varying degrees of success depending on the characteristics of the firm and on the observed 
(by all firms) sector characteristics. Conditional on continuing production, the firm chooses 
inputs. We assume that labour is fully flexible and so the firm’s only input choice at the 
beginning of each period is how much to invest in accumulating capital ( ). 
In sum, the firm’s choice of (i) whether to produce; (ii) which sector to produce in; and (iii) 
what level of inputs to use will depend on the firm’s expected profit. This depends on 
productivity relative to firms in both the same and other sectors, and the firm’s level of 
uncertainty about future market conditions in its own sector versus alternative sectors in the 
industry.8  
The incumbent firm has three options: (i) exit and accept the termination value; (ii) invest in 
sector j; or (iii) invest in sector s for a sunk cost   . The Bellman equation for the firm’s 
problem is given by equation (1). 
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where   is the cost of investment in capital. Capital accumulates in equation (2) as follows: 
       =  1− )     +  1−            +             ) −           )  
           ( 2 )  
where      =1  if the firm switches from sector j to sector s in period t+1.  
As in Olley and Pakes (1996) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) we assume that 
productivity evolves according to an exogenous Markov process. The solution to this 
problem generates an equilibrium strategy for firm decisions to exit, switch and invest, which 
defines the market structure of the industry.9  
In addition, the following key predictions emerge: 
i.  Switchers will be less productive than incumbents. They face a sunk cost of switching 
and the information they have regarding their productivity and market conditions will 
be more specifically related to the sector in which they produce prior to switching.  
                                                 
8  Pavcnik (2002) notes this is consistent with an imperfectly competitive market structure where firm choices 
are dependent on the actions of other firms in the industry. 
9  Ericson and Pakes (1995) prove the existence of a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium for the case where there 
is one sector in the industry. We assume that an equilibrium exists within the framework sketched here and 
use the theoretical predictions to help inform our empirical analysis.  
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ii.  Switchers will be more productive than exits. They too would have exited if their 
expectations about future profitability (which depends on productivity) were less than 
that of exit firms. 
iii.  The extent to which switchers will be more or less productive than entrants is 
ambiguous. Switchers will have greater knowledge of both their productivity potential 
and general market conditions and so are likely to have a higher level of productivity 
than entry firms. However, this will depend on the productivity draw of the entry firm 
which is assumed to be unknown a priori. The sunk costs of switching will be below 
those of entrants. 
iv.  Firm switching depends on observed sector characteristics relative to those of other 
sectors. This is so given that expectations about future market conditions play an 
important role in the decision to switch and exit.  
3 Empirical  approach 
3.1 Empirical  model 
The empirical model for our diagnosis of how firms differ in their probability of switching is 
given in equation (3), which is followed by a set of general observations and information on 
how we estimate productivity. We turn to detailed discussions of the various firm-specific, 
sector-specific, and industry-specific characteristics associated with firm entry, exit and 
switching in subsequent sub-sections.  
        ℎ_       =  
    ,         ⁄ ,log    ),      ,      ,            ,
    ,         ⁄ ,log      ,     ,     ,     ,     ,     ,
  ,   ,   ,   
  (3) 
where      is the productivity of firm i in sector j in period t;         ⁄  is the capital stock of 
firm i in period t; log    ) is the log number of employees of firm i in period t; 	      is a 
dummy indicator for whether the firm i is state-owned in period t;        is a dummy 
indicator for whether the firm i is foreign-owned in period t;              is a dummy 
indicator for whether firm i produces more than one product in period t;      is the dispersion 
in productivity in sector j in period t;         ⁄  is the average capital/labour ratio of sector j in 
period t;          is the average size of firms in sector j in period t;      is the concentration 
ratio in sector j in period t;      is the concentration of foreign-owned firms in sector j in 
period t;      is the concentration of state-owned firms in sector j in period t;      is the tariff 
rate in sector j in period t;      is the level of exports of goods from sector j in period t;    are 
firm-specific fixed effects;    are sector-specific fixed effects;    are time dummies; and    
are province fixed effects to control for differences in the location of firms. The inclusion of 
sector-specific effects controls for any time invariant unobserved differences across sectors 
that may influence the decision of firms within those sectors, while the inclusion of time 
dummies controls for general shocks that affect all sectors equally. 
We note that the decision to switch into a sector, the decision to exit and the decision to enter 
are all modelled in a similar fashion, and highlight that the inclusion of firm-specific fixed 
effects eliminates any time invariant unobserved heterogeneity influencing firms’ decisions to 
enter, exit or switch sectors. As such the identification of the effect of the firm-specific 
effects (included in the model) comes from the within-firm variation in firm characteristics. It 
is possible that some time varying factors remain unobserved and so the (i,t) indexed  
5 
variables are endogenous to firm behaviour, and hence to the switching, entry and exit 
outcomes. Consequently, we are careful not to claim that our results are causal. 
We use an index number approach to estimate total factor productivity for firms in each sub-
sector of the manufacturing sector. This approach is similar to that of Aw et al. (2001) who 
estimated productivity differentials for Taiwanese manufacturing firms.10 Productivity is 
measured relative to a reference point which we take as the mean level of productivity in a 
given sector and year.11 In order to analyse changes in productivity over time we chain link 
this productivity differential to changes in the reference level of productivity from year to 
year.  
The index is given in equation (4), and we highlight that the TFP measure is sector-specific. 
This means that the productivity of a firm is compared—in any given time period—relative to 
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     (4) 
where  ijt Y  measures output of firm i in sector j year t;  mjit X  measures the amount of input m 
used by the firm; and  mjit s  measures the expenditure of the firm on input m as a share of the 
total expenditure of the firm. 
We use firm-specific productivity scores to compute a measure of productivity for each sub-
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10 We only have access to data on the value of inputs and output, so cannot pursue estimating physical 
productivity measures as suggested in Foster et al. (2008). We acknowledge that our revenue based 
productivity measure may—as is the case in most previous studies of enterprise dynamics and 
productivity—confound true efficiency with prices, elasticities and scale economies. 
11 We also perform a robustness check where we use the maximum productivity in the sector as the reference 
point. 
12 We consider both 2-digit and 4-digit levels of aggregation. The 4-digit level of aggregation is complicated 
by the fact that new 4-digit sectors emerge over the course of the sample period, which prevents linking to 
the reference productivity level year-on-year. Where this occurs we use the reference productivity level for 
the 2-digit sector as a whole. The reduced sample which does not use this correction yields very similar 
results (available on request).  
6 
In line with for example Olley and Pakes (1996), this weighted productivity measure can be 
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ω ω  and a term which captures how the allocation of resources within a 
sub-sector in any given year contributes to productivity. 
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3.2 Firm-specific  factors 
Our behavioural framework suggests that productivity is critical to firm decision-making 
since firms evaluate their expected current and future profits on the basis of their own 
observed productivity level. As such we expect the firm’s productivity level to be a first 
significant factor affecting its decision to stay in production, switch sectors or exit production 
altogether.13 Arguably, entry firms are—as already suggested—likely to be less productive 
than switchers and incumbents, since they face higher sunk costs than switchers and have less 
knowledge and expertise, and we expect incumbents to be more productive than switchers for 
similar reasons. 
Second, capital accumulation is a key mechanism for increasing profitability. This suggests 
that capital-intensive firms should increase profitability over time and so should be less likely 
to exit and more likely to enter as the industry evolves. Bernard et al. (2006) find that US 
firms’ capital labour ratios are an important determinant in the decision to switch sectors with 
capital-intensive firms switching to more capital-intensive sectors in response to exposure to 
competition from labour-intensive countries. In the case of Vietnam where labour-intensive 
firms arguably have a comparative advantage, we do not expect firms in labour-intensive 
sectors to have a higher probability of exit.  
Third, the link between firm size and probability of survival has long been established as 
important,14 and this link could impact the firm’s decision to switch sector, with larger firms 
potentially finding it more difficult to retrain employees. To capture this possibility we 
include the size of the firm in terms of the number of employees. 
Fourth, we believe that ownership structure influences firm decision-making in Vietnam, 
even when firm productivity, capital intensity and size are controlled for.15 The political 
hierarchy still present in Vietnamese state-owned enterprise (SOE) management structures is 
                                                 
13 Given that there are difficulties in comparing productivity levels across sectors we also consider where the 
firm ranks in the productivity distribution as an alternative measure. 
14 The age of the firm is also an important predictor of firm survival, but our data do not identify this 
characteristic. In any case, the inclusion of firm-specific fixed effects controls for any initial differences in 
the survival or switching probability of firms attributable to differences in age at the start of the sample 
period. 
15 Choices are involved in classifying firms by ownership type and there are ‘grey’ areas involved in 
distinguishing between state and foreign-owned firms. This is unavoidable in the type of analysis pursued 
here. As regards mergers these are very limited in number as this process is just starting in Vietnam. As such 
merging is of no quantitative significance to our results. In most mergers and acquisitions firms kept at least 
one business registration licence and one tax code registration. This means that one firm stays in our data as 
an incumbent and the rest of the merger firms exit. Note also that mergers and acquisitions are often 
followed by sector switch.  
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likely to limit inter-sector dynamics. SOEs are expected to switch sector less frequently as a 
result. At the same time, the ongoing reform/privatization process has led to the dismantling 
of many SOEs, so we might expect a positive association between state ownership and firm 
closure. Foreign-owned enterprises, or enterprises with some foreign participation, are also 
expected to be more ‘locked into’ specific sectors due to legal constraints.16 With further 
reform of the investment law-making it easier for foreign firms to enter the Vietnamese 
market it is likely that a positive association between foreign ownership and entry and 
potentially switching behaviour will emerge. 
Fifth, the recent attempts by Bernard et al. (2010) and Goldberg et al. (2008) at explaining 
productivity-enhancing reallocations through changes in the product mix suggest that multi-
product firms will be in a better position to product churn (drop inefficient products to 
produce more efficient products) in response to changes in the economic environment.17 
These firms may be in a better position to seek productivity-enhancing reallocations from 
within their product mix rather than through sector switching.18 
3.3 Sector-specific  factors 
A range of sector-specific measures are considered in establishing the competitiveness of the 
sector relative to other sectors in the industry. 
First, higher levels of average productivity would make it more difficult for firms to compete. 
Due to difficulties comparing productivity across sectors we also consider a unit-neutral 
measure of productivity namely the dispersion in the productivity distribution. It is easier to 
survive in sectors with a larger dispersion in productivity given that low productivity levels 
are tolerated. Accordingly, we expect that firms are less likely to leave and more likely to 
enter sectors with a wider dispersion in the productivity distribution. 
Second, the average capital intensity of the sector, as measured by the capital/labour ratio, 
may be influential. While Audretsch (1991) found that firm survival is much less likely 
where there is a high capital-labour ratio, Bernard et al. (2006) found that firms switched into 
more capital intensive sectors when exposed to competitive pressures from imports into 
labour intensive sectors.  
Third, the average size of firms within the sector may affect the firm switching-in decisions. 
The larger the size of the firms in a sector the more difficult it is for entry and switching firms 
to compete given the economies of scale already enjoyed by incumbents. As such we expect 
firms to enter or switch into sectors where firms are smaller on average. 
Fourth, the sector concentration ratio (CR), measured here as the ratio of the accumulated 
revenue of the four largest firms to total revenue in the sector, is likely to be influential given 
                                                 
16 Until recently, foreign and domestic investors were governed by two separate laws: the Law of Foreign 
Investment and the Law of Domestic Investment. A new investment law came into effect in July 2006 
(CIEM, 2006). This law aims at equalizing opportunities for domestic and foreign investors.  
17 Bernard et al. (2010) find that changes in product mix are a potentially important channel for resource 
reallocation in the US with firms exhibiting a large degree of product churning (dropping inefficient 
products to produce more efficient products) in response to changes in the economic environment. In a 
developing country context, Goldberg et al. (2008) find that changes in firms’ product mixes in response to 
regulatory reforms had an important effect on productivity growth in India during the period 1989 to 2003. 
18 The difficulties in measuring the productivity of multi-product firms are highlighted by Bernard et al. 
(2009). As a robustness check we exclude these firms from our analysis. Our results do not change.  
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that it is a proxy for the degree of sector competition. Siegfried and Evans (1994) document 
that a high CR may strengthen collusion efforts among incumbent firms and increase the 
likelihood of behaviour to prevent entry and maintain higher expected profits. In contrast, 
Audretsch (1991) has shown that a high CR helps the survival rates of new entrants in the 
short run. On balance we expect that a high CR reduces firm incentives to move out of (i.e. 
exit or switch out of) a given sector and is indicative of barriers to entry that prevent firms 
from entering or switching into a sector. 
3.4 Industry-specific  factors 
Changes in exogenous conditions may ‘shock’ the behaviour of enterprises leading to 
different productivity outcomes. Examples include sudden shifts in consumer preferences 
affecting demand, supply shocks driven by changes in industry structure due to policy 
reform, new or refined production technologies and trade liberalization. All of these events 
affect product profitability and are thus likely to affect firm allocation decisions in 
accordance with our behavioural framework.  
We consider explicitly the possibility that trade liberalization, in the form of a tariff reduction 
(TR), leads to the exit of low productivity firms or the switching of firms to sectors that 
remain protected. Given that trade liberalization may lead to more opportunities on export 
markets we also hypothesise that more productive firms will switch to sectors where these 
opportunities emerge (EX). 
It is in the case of Vietnam also of interest to explore the impact that deregulation in the form 
of privatization of SOEs and the opening up of the market to entry by foreign-owned 
enterprises may have had on the manufacturing industry.19 Where an entire industry is 
undergoing deregulation as is the case in Vietnam, a significant amount of productivity-
enhancing reallocations are likely to take place. We expect the dominance of state enterprises 
(SR) (state-owned enterprise share of total sector output) to play a role in exit and switching 
decisions. Preferential treatment of SOEs makes it difficult for non-state enterprises to 
compete and may force more efficient non-state firms to exit (or decide not to enter highly 
SOE concentrated industries).  
At the same time, during the ongoing transition from a planning to a market economy the 
SOE share of material inputs bought at market conditions may, as suggested by Jefferson and 
Rawski (1994) in the case of China, increase the attractiveness of highly SOE concentrated 
industries for smaller (private) enterprises acting as producers of intermediates for SOEs. 
Another dimension is that the deregulation of SOEs may increase competition in a sector due 
to the decline in the level of protection and barriers to entry and may induce firms to switch 
to other sectors.  
Similar arguments apply when considering the dominance of foreign enterprises (FR) 
(foreign enterprise share of total sector output). Aitkin and Harrison (1999) emphasise that 
preferential treatment of foreign-owned firms may distort competition and force (equally 
                                                 
19 Olley and Pakes (1996) found that the restructuring of the telecom industry in the USA involved significant 
entry and exit with post-deregulation productivity improvements being mostly attributable to the reallocation 
of capital toward more productive firms. Similar results have been found for other sectors such as the US 
banking sector, for example (Stiroh and Strahan, 2003). Elsava et al. (2004) find that market reforms lead to 
reallocations away from low productivity firms to high productivity firms resulting in aggregate productivity 
gains.  
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efficient) domestically owned counterparts out.20 However, one reason why governments 
grant special treatment is to promote technology transfer, and new products and/or production 
processes introduced by foreign firms may indeed spill-over to domestic firms. Diffusion can 
also occur through labour turnover, so a high presence of foreign enterprises in a particular 
sector may attract domestic firms. In sum, whether FR is positively or negatively related to 
sector switching and firm exit depends on which of the above effects dominate (competition 
versus technology transfer).21 
4 Data 
Our data originate from the 2001–08 Enterprise Surveys collected annually by the General 
Statistics Office of Vietnam and include the population of all registered enterprises with 30 
employees or more and a representative sample of smaller firms.22 We include all firms 
whose main enterprise is in the manufacturing sector.23 Our sample therefore includes almost 
31,000 firms. 
Table 1 presents the numbers of firms included in our dataset in each sector in each year and 
the sample of manufacturing firms used in our analysis for which a complete set of 
information is available.24  
Table 2 illustrates the extent of diversification within the manufacturing sector. First, we 
present the number of 4-digit sub-sectors within each 2-digit sector which varies considerably 
across sectors. We do not have data to examine product diversification at the 6-digit level, as 
in Bernard et al. (2010) and Goldberg et al. (2008). However, we can tell whether firms 
produce more than one product and find that between 5 to 17 per cent of manufacturing firms 
do so. For these firms diversification across product mix is a potential source of productivity 
growth that we cannot capture in our analysis.  
We use both 2-digit and 4-digit classifications of economic activity and switching behaviour 
in our analysis. While Bernard et al. (2006) focus exclusively on 4-digit switching we find 
that for Vietnam a large amount of switching occurs, even at more aggregated levels. Table 2 
highlights the significant extent of enterprise dynamics within each 2-digit manufacturing 
sector. This is consistent with much of the existing literature on firm dynamics which finds a 
                                                 
20 Evidence for Venezuela suggests that once sector-specific effects are controlled for, domestic firms perform 
worse as foreign dominance in a sector increases (Tybout, 2000). 
21 Foreign enterprises may also create a basis for domestically owned firms to produce intermediate inputs as 
in the case of SOEs. Therefore, inter-industry spillovers from FDI may occur. Javorcik (2004) finds 
evidence of backward linkages for Lithuania while Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) find similar evidence 
for Venezuela, Brazil and Chile.  
22 Trade and tariff data are from the World Integrated Trade Solutions database. Trade data at the 4-digit (2-
digit) level for Vietnam with the rest of the world are taken from the UN COMTRADE database. Tariff data 
refer to the 4-digit (2-digit) weighted average Most Favoured Nation tariff applied to imports collected from 
the UNCTAD-TRAINS database for all imports into Vietnam 
23 Given that only a representative sample of small firms is included it is possible that the entry, exit and 
switching behaviour of small firms is not fully observed. As a robustness check we also analyse firms with 
30 employees or more. 
24 We use both 2-digit and 4-digit classifications of economic activity in our analysis and slightly different 
samples are available depending on which classification we use.  
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positive correlation between exit and entry rates at the sector level.25 We also see a very high 
level of switching behaviour at both the 2-digit and 4-digit level across sectors ranging from 
1 to 19 percent of firms when switching is defined at the 2-digit level and from 12 to 50 
percent when switching is defined at the 4-digit level.  
To place the extent of switching behaviour in Vietnam in context, Bernard et al. (2006) found 
that approximately 8 percent of US manufacturing firms switched activity (defined at the 4-
digit level) during 5-year periods between 1977 and 1997. The fact that switching is much 
more prevalent in Vietnam reflects in our assessment an evolving industrial sector where new 
opportunities emerge due to deregulation and trade liberalization, as well as due to ongoing 
structural transformation. The extent of switching behaviour observed adds further weight to 
our view that the effects of switching on productivity should be decomposed from the effects 
due to standard exit/entry; and that a better understanding of the drivers behind switching is 
potentially rewarding from the perspective of designing effective economic policy. 
As discussed in Section 3, our empirical model includes a range of firm- and sector-specific 
factors. Summary statistics are provided in Appendix A1. Before proceeding in Section 5 to 
estimating our empirical model we explore the mean difference in each sector-specific 
characteristic before and after a firm switches sector to establish a priori whether there is a 
clear pattern to switching behaviour in the raw data. The results are presented in Table 3. 
Statistically significant sector-specific differences emerge when comparing the sector 
characteristics of switching firms before and after they switch sectors. With the exception of 
sector level productivity, these differences hold when switching and sector-specific 
characteristics are defined at the 2-digit or 4-digit level. We also find some evidence to 
suggest that firms move into sectors where they are more likely to be able to compete. For 
example, firms switch into sectors with smaller average firm size and with lower 
concentration ratios. They also switch into sectors with lower levels of concentration of state-
owned enterprises suggesting that firms may be pushed out of these sectors or, alternatively, 
find better opportunities available in other sectors. In contrast, we find that firms switch into 
sectors with high levels of foreign-owned enterprises that are more export-intensive. This 
suggests that these sectors may have better opportunities for firms.  
In contrast to the Bernard et al. (2006) findings for US manufacturing firms it appears that 
firms switch into more labour-intensive sectors. This is consistent with the view that Vietnam 
has a competitive advantage in labour-intensive production and that firms are reacting to new 
opportunities for exports from these sectors. In contrast to our expectations we find that firms 
switch into sectors with lower tariffs suggesting that they are not deterred by the increased 
competitive pressures from imports. Finally, we find that firms switch into sectors where 
average productivity levels are lower, but this result only holds for the 4-digit measure of 
productivity and switching. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Dunne et al. (1988) and Disney et al. (2003) find a high level of correlation between entry and exit rates 
within the US and UK manufacturing industries, respectively. Roberts and Tybout (1996) find similar 
evidence in a developing country context.  
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5 Empirical  results 
5.1 Productivity  growth 
We first estimate productivity for each sub-sector of the manufacturing industry.26 Table 4 
presents the trend in productivity by sector from 2001 to 2008 computed using the index 
number approach outlined in Section 3.27 The contribution of firm turnover (including firm 
exit, entry and switching) to productivity is captured by the covariance between output and 
productivity. It is clear that the reallocation of market share from less to more productive 
activities is an important component of productivity growth. On average the reallocation 
component of productivity accounts for 40 percent of total productivity growth ranging from 
9 to 137 percent, depending on the sector and the year.28  
To determine whether switching is economically important we must, next, compare 
productivity between incumbents, entrants, exits and switchers. This involves assessing 
productivity performances across sectors. This is not straightforward. Relying on productivity 
levels is not appropriate given that in the construction of the productivity index firms are 
positioned relative to the average within the sector, making comparisons across sectors 
impossible to interpret.  
To overcome this challenge, we rank the productivity performance of each firm within each 
sector and average this ranking across the lifetime of the firm. We then perform simple t-tests 
of the difference between incumbent, switching, entry and exit firms in terms of their average 
productivity ranking. The results are presented in Table 5 for productivity estimated using the 
index number approach both at the 2-digit and 4-digit level. For the former measure, 
switching is also defined at the 2-digit level, while for the latter it is defined at the 4-digit 
level. Each firm in the sample is counted once for the purpose of these tests. 
We find that incumbent firms rank higher in the productivity distribution than entry and exit 
firms on both the 2-digit and 4-digit productivity measure, and this is so both when switchers 
are included with incumbents and when they are excluded. We also find that entry firms rank 
higher than exit firms for the duration of their survival in the panel. This is consistent with the 
extensive literature cited above which emphasises resource reallocations involving the exit 
and entry of firms into sectors as an important source of productivity growth.  
Our behavioural framework predicts that due to information advantages switchers will be 
more productive than entry and exit firms, but less productive than incumbents given that the 
latter will have more information about the sector they are producing in than firms that have 
just switched into that sector. Our results show that switchers rank higher in terms of 
productivity than entry and exit firms, suggesting that switching firms are indeed a separate 
                                                 
26    The input and output variables used in the construction of the productivity indices are summarized in 
Appendix A2. 
27 The figures presented are computed based on a 2-digit level of aggregation but the results are very similar 
when productivity is first measured at the 4-digit level and then aggregated to the 2-digit level. As a further 
robustness check we have estimated productivity using the Olley and Pakes (1996) approach for each 2-digit 
sub-sector. A very similar trend in productivity and disaggregation among the components of the index is 
found. Missing data on investment levels leads to a reduced sample when this approach is used. The results 
are available on request. The magnitude of the productivity estimates is neither directly interpretable, nor 
comparable across sectors. The focus should be on the trend over time and the importance of the reallocation 
component to overall productivity growth. 
28 In many sectors pure productivity improvements are also an important component of growth.  
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important source of productivity growth. We also find that incumbents have a higher 
productivity ranking than switchers, consistent with our theoretical predictions.29 
5.2 Switching  behaviour   
Having established that sector switching is important for productivity growth we focus in the 
remainder of the empirical analysis on exploring switching behaviour. 
Our behavioural model predicts that, conditional on firm-specific productivity, profitability 
and other characteristics, firms will base their exit and switching decisions on their 
expectations about future profitability and opportunities, both within the sector they are 
producing and in other sectors within the industry. In our empirical model we measure these 
expectations using observed sector characteristics relative to those of other sectors in the 
industry. Accordingly, we include sector-specific fixed effects, and this approach implies that 
the effect of sector-specific characteristics on firms’ decisions is identified through the 
between sector variation in these observed characteristics. The mechanism through which 
sector-specific factors impact on the firm’s decision making process is through the 
information it provides about market conditions in one sector relative to another.  
To ascertain the importance of the above factors we rely on the model given in equation (3). 
We first include firm-specific factors along with firm-specific fixed effects, sector, province 
and time controls, and next we expand the model to include sector-specific factors, reflecting 
the extent to which regulatory reform and trade liberalization has induced entry, exit and 
switching behaviour. 
The first set of results relate to the decision of firms to switch into a particular sector. We 
present the results for the decision to switch out of a particular sector alongside these results 
since the former will identify the sector-specific pull factors affecting switching while the 
latter identifies the sector-specific push factors. The results for the 2-digit classifications of 
switching and the sector-specific variables included are presented in Table 6a while those for 
the 4-digit classification are shown in Table 6b. 
The firm-specific factors associated with switching behaviour are largely the same, 
independently of whether the 2-digit or 4-digit classification is used. Switching firms rank 
higher in the productivity distribution of the sectors they switch into than other firms; and 
they rank below incumbents and other firms in the sectors they switch out of. This provides 
evidence that firms, which switch sectors, manage to improve their relative performance, and 
it suggests that our theoretical prediction seems to hold, i.e. that switching sectors to exploit 
profitable opportunities is a viable alternative to exiting production. It should be noted, 
however, that this depends on the assumption that relative productivity is a good indicator of 
profitability. 
We also find that switching firms tend to be larger than other firms in the sectors they switch 
into and smaller than the firms in the sectors they switch out of.30 Given that much of the 
literature suggests a positive association between size and survival probability, this finding 
indicates that firms switch to sectors where they are larger than other firms and therefore will 
                                                 
29 Comparing productivity levels across groups of firms leads to the same conclusions. Results are available on 
request. 
30 Dunne et al. (1988) find that firms that diversify into other industries are larger than new entrants and so are 
less likely to fail. Our findings are consistent with this result.  
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survive longer. There is also evidence in our results that switchers tend to have a lower 
capital-labour ratio than non-switching firms. This means that labour intensive firms are more 
likely to be switchers than capital-intensive firms. Moreover, there is evidence that multi-
product firms are less likely to switch. This is in accordance with recent literature including 
Bernard et al. (2010) and Goldberg et al. (2008), which shows that multi-product firms have 
the potential to change their product mix in response to changing market conditions without 
switching sector. 
The observed characteristics of sectors that are statistically important vary depending on 
whether switching is defined at the 2- or the 4-digit level. Focusing, first, on the 2-digit 
definition (Table 6a) we find that firms are more likely to switch into sectors with larger 
firms (on average), a greater concentration of foreign-owned firms, but lower concentration 
ratios in general. This is contrary to our initial expectations about the direction of the 
relationship between these sector-specific factors and firm behaviour presented in Section 3. 
We expected firms to be deterred from switching into sectors where firms are on average 
larger given the potential economies of scale advantage that incumbents might enjoy. 
However, given our earlier result that switchers are more likely to be labour-intensive firms it 
is not really surprising that they switch into labour-intensive sectors.  
Furthermore, it was also expected that a high CR might reduce firms’ incentives to move out 
of a sector, but we find the opposite to be the case. That is, firms switch out of sectors with 
higher concentration ratios. This suggests that firms are more likely to switch into sectors that 
are more competitive than the ones they leave meaning that switching firms may seek out 
sectors that are less subjected to regulation.  
Our literature review also led us to expect that firms would avoid sectors with a dominance of 
foreign enterprises (Aitkin and Harrison, 1999; Tybout, 2000). Instead we find that firms 
switch out of sectors with low levels of foreign ownership and into sectors with high levels of 
foreign ownership. This is indicative of a general move by firms toward more competitive 
sectors, and opens up for the possibility that the presence of learning spill-over effects and 
technology diffusion tend to make a sector attractive to domestic enterprises. 
The behaviour of switching firms may also be explained, in part, by the ongoing process of 
structural change that took place in Vietnam over the time frame of the present analysis 
which opened up new competitive opportunities in many sectors. Nevertheless, Vietnamese 
firms are less likely to switch out of sectors with a high concentration of state ownership. 
This suggests that rigidities remain within parts of the manufacturing sector as a whole and 
prevent further productivity improvements from being realized.  
Finally, in relation to trade liberalization, firms appear to switch into 2-digit sectors with low 
levels of export intensity relative to other 2-digit sectors and switch out of sectors with low 
tariff levels relative to other 2-digit sectors. This suggests that at an aggregate level firms are 
deterred from switching into sectors with high levels of trade exposure and choose to switch 
out of sectors that are more exposed to competition as a result of the ongoing process of tariff 
reductions. In sum, when we consider the 2-digit level of aggregation, the process of market 
liberalization appears to encourage firms to switch to more competitive sectors while trade 
liberalization has the opposite effect. 
When switching is defined at the 4-digit level different sector-specific drivers emerge as 
being important. In particular, we find that many sector-specific factors are similar pre- and 
post-switching suggesting that switching at the 4-digit level is between sectors with similar 
characteristics. For example, firms appear to switch between high productivity sectors and  
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between sectors where firms are in general larger in terms of the number of employees. Given 
that our analysis is set in a developing country context where labour costs are relatively low, 
coupled with the evidence that firms are more likely to switch into sectors with low capital-
labour ratios, it is not surprising that our analysis shows that firms are switching into sectors 
where they can potentially exploit low labour cost advantages.  
In relation to the market structure variables, and in contrast to the results for 2-digit 
switching, we find that at the 4-digit level switching is less likely to occur in sectors with a 
large proportion of foreign and state-owned firms. We also observe that firms are more likely 
to switch into sectors with low concentration ratios meaning that they are not deterred by 
competition. Further support for this is the fact that we find strong evidence to suggest that 
firms switch into sectors with low tariff levels and out of sectors with high tariff levels and 
low levels of trade exposure. When considered alongside the results at the 2-digit level this 
means that at an aggregate level firms will make significant changes to the nature of their 
production to protect themselves against increased competition, while they are willing to 
switch to a different 4-digit sector to exploit potential opportunities that trade reform may 
afford. 
5.3  Firm entry and exit  
Table 7 presents the results of our empirical model describing the entry and exit decisions of 
firms in our data. Sector characteristics are aggregated at the 2-digit level but results are very 
similar at the 4-digit level.31 
Dunne et al. (1988) find a significant amount of heterogeneity in the characteristics of entry 
firms in the US manufacturing sector. This is also the situation for Vietnam. In the case of 
firm-specific factors our results show that entry firms have lower productivity levels than 
incumbents and firms that switch into a sector. They are more capital intensive, and 
consistent with this observation, are of a smaller size in terms of the number of employees 
than other firms. Entry firms are more likely to be private domestic firms as opposed to state-
owned firms or foreign-owned firms. This reflects deregulation of the manufacturing sector 
over the period of the analysis, which opened up many new opportunities for private 
domestic firms.  
There is also some evidence that entry firms are more likely to be multi-product firms, which 
means that a new type of more flexible enterprise seems to have emerged over the period 
under study. Consistent with the literature on firm survival, smaller firms are, according to 
our analysis, more likely to exit production. Exit is associated in a statistically significant way 
with state ownership, rooted in the ongoing reform process discussed by CIEM (2003). It is 
clear from this analysis that the firm-specific characteristics of entry and exit firms are very 
different from those of switching firms.  
In sum, our entry and exit results are consistent with the existing literature on industry 
evolution, but our expanded analysis identifying switching as separate from exit and entry 
points to a dimension that has so far gone completely unexplored in developing country 
contexts. 
Further differences are embedded in sector-specific characteristics. Our results show that 
firms are more likely to enter sectors with high concentration ratios, which is consistent with 
                                                 
31 These results are not shown but are available on request.  
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the Audretsch (1991) finding that a high CR may help the survival rates of new entrants in 
the short run. Meanwhile firms are also less likely to enter sectors with a high concentration 
of foreign-owned firms, consistent both with our finding for switching firms (4-digit) and the 
idea that preferential treatment of foreign-owned firms may distort competition deterring 
domestic firms from entering into sectors with a high foreign presence, as suggested by 
Aitkin and Harrison (1999) and Tybout (2000). Finally, we find that firms are less likely to 
enter sectors with high tariff levels, meaning that barriers to entry may exist in these sectors. 
5.4 Robustness  checks 
First, we consider a sub-set of data focusing in particular on large manufacturing firms 
(above 30 employees) for which we have a full population of firms. Second, we consider a 
sub-sample of private firms. Third, we exclude all multi-product firms given that measuring 
productivity is complicated for firms that produce more than one product. Fourth, we exclude 
firms that exit and re-enter the sample. Fifth, we consider two alternative measures of 
productivity, as discussed in Section 3, namely an index number approach based on a relative 
measure of productivity, which compares firms with the best producing firm in a sector, and a 
measure constructed using the Olley and Pakes (1996) semi-parametric approach to 
productivity measurement. The results for these six alternative specifications are presented in 
Table 8. 
The most consistent findings across all specifications are that switching firms (i) have a lower 
capital labour ratio than other firms, (ii) are larger in terms of number of employees, (iii) are 
unlikely to be multi-product firms, (iv) switch between high productivity sectors,32 (v) are 
more likely to switch into sectors with low capital to labour ratios,33 and (vi) are more likely 
to switch into sectors with low tariff levels and out of sectors with low levels of export 
intensity. 
6 Conclusion 
The point of departure of this paper was the observation that while sector switchers are likely 
to have different characteristics and behaviour from ‘real’ exit and entry firms, this has never 
been studied and established empirically in developing country contexts. Arguably, this is an 
important omission in the existing literature on firm dynamics, and our understanding of the 
productivity impacts of firm turn-over and resource reallocations at both firm- and sector 
levels.  
To help motivate and frame our empirical investigation of switching we adapted a 
behavioural framework based on Ericson and Pakes (1995), and proceeded to identify a list of 
key predictions about the productivity impact of switching. We also specified our detailed 
empirical model. 
Data for our case study, focusing on sector switching in the manufacturing sector, originate 
from the 2001 to 2008 Enterprise Surveys collected annually by the General Statistics Office 
                                                 
32 One exception to this is when productivity is measured relative to the benchmark of the best performing 
firm. In this case our results suggest the firms switch out of low productivity sectors into high productivity 
sectors. 
33 The only exception to this finding is for the sub-sample of large firms which are more likely to switch into 
high capital intensive sectors.   
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(GSO) of Vietnam. On this basis we have been fortunate to distil a unique panel dataset 
covering a very large number of manufacturing firms, including almost 31,000 firms for 
which complete information is available.  
We found solid evidence that the reallocation of resources within and across sectors accounts 
for a significant proportion of total productivity growth in the Vietnamese manufacturing 
sector in the period studied, but also that firm switchers make an important contribution to 
these reallocations. They are indeed more productive than both entrants and exits, and firms 
which switch sector improve their productivity ranking on average, while entry firms rank 
lower in the productivity distribution.  
Our analysis also revealed that switching firms have different characteristics to entry and exit 
firms and appear to be motivated by different sector-specific factors. For example, switching 
firms have a lower capital to labour ratio than entry firms, and firms which switch tend to be 
larger than firms in the sector they switch into, while entry firms tend to be smaller than other 
firms in the sector. Another insight is that multi-product firms are less likely to switch 
sectors. Deregulation and privatization induces switching behaviour at an aggregate level 
with firms switching into more competitive sectors, but switching at a disaggregate level 
occurs across similar sectors in terms of market structure. Finally, trade liberalization is 
positively associated with switching behaviour. At an aggregate level firms have switched 
from sectors exposed to trade into more protected sectors; while at a disaggregate level firms 
are more likely to switch into sectors with opportunities to trade. 
Our analytical framework and empirical insights could, in our assessment, serve as a useful 
starting point for similar analyses in other developing countries and help inspire the necessary 
redesign of enterprise surveys across the developing world. Getting the respective 
contributions of entry, exist and switching firms to productivity growth right has important 
analytical and policy implications, but at this stage empirical evidence is almost non-existent.  
For Vietnam we conclude that: (i) there is a much more complex story of firm dynamics 
underlying the robust economic progress achieved in this dynamic East Asian economy than 
inherent in standard firm exit and entry explanations, (ii) firms have in practice adjusted to 
changing circumstances in sometimes innovative but not always easily predictable ways, (iii) 
government policy (including trade, information, credit, training and other support 
programmes as well as the development of the legal framework for business sector 
development) should pay careful attention to both the potential for productivity-enhancing 
reallocations through sector switching as well as the need to avoid that firms are motivated to 
switch into sectors that are not associated with comparative advantage. 
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Table 1: Panel attrition  
 Total  Agriculture Manufacturing  Services  Sample  (2-digit)  Sample  (4-digit)
2001  56,295 4,255  13,142 38,898 9,858  9,858 
2002  62,510 4,218  14,654 43,638 11,581 11,583 
2003  71,479 3,381  16,746 51,352 13,239 13,241 
2004  91,139 3,510  20,341 67,288 15,739 15,750 
2005  112,251  3,674  23,836 84,741 18,664 18,668 
2006  129,165  3,695  26,131 99,339 21,824 21,830 
2007 155,432  4,113  30,922  120,397  24,301  24,305 
2008  205,396  10,779 38,269 156,348  30,867 30,869 
Note: Sector allocation refers to enterprises’ main activity. 
Source: authors’ calculations.  
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15 Food products and bev.  23  10.83  49.63  68.35  1.04  12.96 
16  Tobacco  products 2  19.05 42.86 33.33 2.38  57.14 
17  Textiles  13  8.26  46.06 78.01 8.99  28.40 
18 Wearing apparel  9  5.09  53.35  84.36  6.09  21.18 
19 Tanning/dressing leather 8  7.98  48.02  74.98  10.61  29.12 
20 Wood and wood 
products 
10  12.79 53.04 81.08 10.38 22.54 
21 Paper and paper 
products 
3  9.10  48.15 77.67 6.49  23.90 
22 Publishing, printing, etc  9  5.06  49.70  88.55  5.17  15.03 
23 Coke, refined petroleum  7  7.14  55.71  82.86  11.43  27.14 
24 Chemicals and chem. 
prod. 
11  11.47 47.92 78.59 6.13  14.81 
25 Rubber and plastics  8  8.47  42.22  80.86  10.56  28.67 
26 Other non-metallic 
mineral 
15  16.77 49.64 68.97 3.71  15.72 
27  Basic  metals  11  16.58 44.19 81.80 11.22 35.09 
28  Fabricated  metals 8  10.10 48.90 86.84 8.74  26.18 
29 Machinery and 
equipment 
17  9.40  48.52 81.31 19.36 32.90 
30 Office equipment  7  6.09  61.74  93.91  7.83  23.48 
31  Electrical  machinery  24  12.12 51.01 79.60 15.15 38.89 
32 Radio, television, etc  9  7.23  51.98  82.10  10.33  29.95 
33 Medical, precision and 
opt. 
9  7.48  47.64 80.31 13.78 23.23 
34  Motor  vehicles,  transport  13  13.58 57.21 72.96 18.87 32.21 
35 Other transport equip.  14  17.78  46.58  73.69  11.02  35.24 
36  Furniture  20  9.86  52.78 82.98 12.55 25.96 
37  Recycling  7  10.96 42.47 90.41 17.81 26.71 
Note: Statistics are based on all enterprises operating in 2008 whose main output was in the manufacturing 
sector at some stage between 2001 and 2008. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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before and after 
switch 
t-statistic 
(difference = 0) 
P-value 
WTFP  4,488 0.004 1.596 0.111 
lnKL  6,251  -0.032 -6.384 0.000 
Size  6,251  -0.067 -8.716 0.000 
CR  6,251  -0.008 -4.722 0.000 
FR  6,249 0.015 4.828 0.000 
SR 6,171  -0.031  -13.267  0.000 
Tariff  5,207  -0.011 -5.044 0.000 





before and after 
switch 
t-statistic 
(mean = 0) 
P-value 
WTFP 16,652  -0.156  -52.775  0.000 
lnKL 22,585  -0.044  -17.683  0.000 
Size 22,583  -0.042  -11.347  0.000 
CR 22,473  -0.020  -14.362  0.000 
FR  21,873 0.015  10.900 0.000 
SR 20,620  -0.033  -24.318  0.000 
Tariff  13,448  -0.009 -5.737 0.000 
Exports  13,450 0.381  21.972 0.000 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4: Weighted productivity estimates and decomposition (manufacturing sample)  
Activity 15  n  Weighted  Covariance  Activity 17  n  Weighted  Covariance 
2001  2,722 0.173  0.115  2001 385  0.299 0.093 
2002  2,962 0.198  0.123  2002 471  0.301 0.118 
2003  3,046 0.215  0.140  2003 551  0.643 0.120 
2004  3,280 0.494  0.149  2004 635  0.495 0.127 
2005  3,665 0.530  0.163  2005 784  0.528 0.117 
2006  4,383 0.587  0.162  2006 957  0.601 0.179 
2007  4,506 0.385  0.153  2007 1,058 0.373 0.124 
2008  5,306 0.721  0.142  2008 1,293 0.288 0.086 
Activity 18  n  Weighted  Covariance  Activity 19  n  Weighted  Covariance 
2001 524  0.413  0.144 2001  236  0.203  0.098 
2002 766  0.487  0.172 2002  290  0.258  0.165 
2003 934  0.363  0.156 2003  316  0.281  0.095 
2004  1,206 0.466  0.166  2004 395  0.360 0.130 
2005  1,320 0.537  0.149  2005 453  0.389 0.072 
2006  1,548 0.525  0.150  2006 441  0.479 0.109 
2007  1,783 0.338  0.096  2007 524  0.340 0.106 
2008  2,580 0.568  0.071  2008 659  0.387 0.039 
Activity 20  n  Weighted  Covariance  Activity 21  n  Weighted  Covariance 
2001 726  0.116  0.117 2001  431  0.106  0.074 
2002 818  0.173  0.111 2002  494  0.187  0.072 
2003 914  0.486  0.104 2003  596  0.241  0.074 
2004  1,096 0.354  0.111  2004 689  0.210 0.087 
2005  1,261 0.440  0.113  2005 871  0.261 0.089 
2006  1,440 0.387  0.087  2006 960  0.185 0.077 
2007  1,755 0.411  0.100  2007 1,033 0.257 0.085 
2008  2,366 0.554  0.091  2008 1,301 0.598 0.062 
Activity 22  n  Weighted  Covariance  Activity 24  n  Weighted  Covariance 
2001 335  0.249  0.136 2001  428  0.277  0.101 
2002 454  0.269  0.182 2002  509  0.321  0.142 
2003 580  0.581  0.190 2003  598  0.538  0.149 
2004 820  0.497  0.202 2004  688  0.579  0.189 
2005  1,023 0.536  0.182  2005 840  0.673 0.200 
2006  1,564 0.466  0.170  2006 1,026 0.563 0.200 
2007  1,457 0.310  0.182  2007 1,120 0.442 0.167 
2008  1,890 0.754  0.139  2008 1,376 0.674 0.155 
Activity 25  n  Weighted  Covariance  Activity 26  n  Weighted  Covariance 
2001 525  0.154  0.077 2001  1,051  0.679  0.672 
2002 683  0.182  0.104 2002  1,069  0.336  0.257 
2003 769  0.420  0.096 2003  1,122  0.476  0.232 
2004 971  0.371  0.105 2004  1,282  0.547  0.206  
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2005  1,222 0.499  0.105  2005 1,425 0.587 0.206 
2006  1,427 0.404  0.098  2006 1,479 0.558 0.182 
2007  1,664 0.185  0.082  2007 1,641 0.462 0.187 
2008  2,000 0.556  0.051  2008 2,004 0.667 0.178 
Activity 27  n  Weighted  Covariance  Activity 28  n  Weighted  Covariance 
2001 142  0.180  0.139 2001  725  0.157  0.133 
2002 185  0.299  0.130 2002  941  0.182  0.133 
2003 223  0.329  0.115 2003  1,239  0.395  0.122 
2004 267  0.363  0.096 2004  1,611  0.405  0.111 
2005 351  0.408  0.082 2005  2,057  0.473  0.119 
2006 388  0.331  0.093 2006  2,551  0.367  0.114 
2007 510  0.363  0.111 2007  3,009  0.294  0.101 
2008 634  0.090  0.079 2008  3,984  0.495  0.091 
Activity 29  n  Weighted  Covariance  Activity 31  n  Weighted  Covariance 
2001 264  0.296  0.088 2001 167  0.179  0.087 
2002 342  0.306  0.115 2002 195  0.110  0.118 
2003 404  0.285  0.125 2003 238  0.530  0.123 
2004 466  0.604  0.130 2004 316  0.673  0.207 
2005 559  0.451  0.125 2005 372  0.335  0.130 
2006 628  0.439  0.136 2006 398  0.204  0.132 
2007 758  0.337  0.125 2007 385  0.251  0.110 
2008 887  0.279  0.091 2008 498  0.764  0.076 
Activity 32  n  Weighted  Covariance  Activity 33  n  Weighted  Covariance 
2001 76  0.280  0.109 2001 37  0.408  0.089 
2002 101  0.299  0.213 2002 49  0.428  0.066 
2003 125  0.471  0.206 2003 53  0.213  0.048 
2004 151  0.378  0.246 2004 60  0.595  0.119 
2005 169  0.664  0.201 2005 83  0.249  0.163 
2006 187  0.578  0.150 2006 95  0.245  0.091 
2007 229  0.249  0.133 2007 101  0.551  0.096 
2008 299  0.395  0.227 2008 125  0.450  0.111 
Activity 34  n  Weighted  Covariance  Activity 35  n  Weighted  Covariance 
2001 182  0.214  0.293 2001 250  0.358  0.184 
2002 222  0.249  0.267 2002 298  0.303  0.175 
2003 222  0.568  0.269 2003 344  0.521  0.200 
2004 247  0.426  0.219 2004 363  0.529  0.207 
2005 301  0.625  0.193 2005 452  0.587  0.195 
2006 239  0.514  0.146 2006 452  0.483  0.179 
2007 275  0.331  0.164 2007 558  0.483  0.195 
2008 348  0.446  0.178 2008 618  0.914  0.141 
Activity 36  n  Weighted  Covariance          
2001 601  0.175  0.132         
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2002 679  0.307  0.208        
2003 901  0.618  0.130        
2004  1,118 0.512 0.141        
2005  1,373 0.515 0.123        
2006  1,552 0.475 0.097        
2007  1,793 0.405 0.110        
2008  2,510 0.542 0.090        
Note: Sectors 16, 23, 30 and 37 are excluded due to the small number of firms that operate in these sectors. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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(Difference = 0) 
P-value 
Incumbents (incl. switcher) 6,683  0.572     
Entry  firms  38,891 0.415  47.363 0.000 
Incumbents (excl. 
switcher) 
2,936 0.570    
Entry  firms  38,891 0.415  32.478 0.000 
Incumbents (incl. switcher) 6,683  0.572     
Exit  firms  22,217 0.398  50.341 0.000 
Incumbents (excl. 
switcher) 
2,936 0.570    
Exit  firms  22,217 0.398  35.619 0.000 
Entry firms  21,896  0.438     
Exit  firms  22,217 0.398  16.916 0.000 
Entry firms  39,775  0.427     
Switch  firms  4,486 0.450 -5.751  0.000 
Exit firms  26,559  0.422     
Switch  firms  4,486 0.450 -6.790  0.000 
Incumbent firms  11,535  0.505     
Switch  firms  4,486 0.450 12.344  0.000 
4-digit productivity 
measure 
Number of firms 




(Difference = 0) 
P-value 
Incumbents (incl. switcher) 6,683  0.576     
Entry  firms  38,904 0.416  47.714 0.000 
Incumbents (excl. 
switcher) 
2,936 0.567    
Entry  firms  38,904 0.416  31.229 0.000 
Incumbents (incl. switcher) 6,683  0.576     
Exit  firms  22,225 0.397  50.626 0.000 
Incumbents (excl. 
switcher) 
2,936 0.567    
Exit  firms  22,225 0.397  34.300 0.000 
Entry firms  21,901  0.440     
Exit  firms  22,225 0.397  18.156 0.000 
Entry firms  31,186  0.411     
Switch firms  13,088  0.479  -25.507  0.000 
Exit firms  17,967  0.393     
Switch firms  13,088  0.479  -29.459  0.000 
Incumbent  firms  2,936 0.567    
Switch  firms  13,088 0.479  16.691 0.000 
Source: authors’ calculations.     
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Table 6a: Determinants of switching—2-digit definition 
  Switch IN  Switch OUT 
Firm-specific          
Productivity  0.001  0.003  0.003    -0.002 -0.004 -0.003  
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)   (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)  
Rank  productivity     0.010**     -0.013*** 
     (0.005)     (0.005) 
lnK/L  -0.003** -0.003** -0.003***  -0.003** 0.0002  0.0002  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size  0.005**  0.005**  0.004*  0.003*  -0.004** -0.004** -0.004*  -0.003* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
State-owned -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.001  0.001  0.0003 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Foreign-owned  0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.009 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
Multi-product  0.004  0.004  0.007*  0.006*  -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.007** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Sector-specific          
Productivity
Ω   0.009  0.004    -0.022***  -0.029***   
   (0.008)  (0.008)    (0.008)  (0.009)   
IQR productivity
Ω     0.005     -0.009* 
     (0.004)     (0.005) 
lnK/L
Ω    0.004 0.012 0.013   0.062***  0.047***  0.048*** 
   (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)   (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Size
 Ω  0.024***  0.019**  0.021**   -0.034***  -0.033***  -0.032*** 
   (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)   (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
CR
 Ω   -0.063  -0.112**  -0.107**   0.184***  0.214***  0.195*** 
   (0.043)  (0.047)  (0.045)   (0.042)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
FR
 Ω   0.155***  0.154***  0.151***   -0.079**  -0.068**  -0.050 
   (0.035)  (0.037)  (0.036)   (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.033) 
SR
 Ω   -0.041  -0.027  -0.029   -0.142***  -0.151***  -0.146*** 
   (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.028)   (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
Tariff level
Ω    0.012  0.013    -0.061**  -0.048** 
    (0.019)  (0.019)    (0.024)  (0.023) 
Export intensity
Ω    -0.005*  -0.006*    0.007**  0.007** 
    (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.003) 
Observations  136,204 135,978 128,844 128,844 115,195 114,908 108,877 108,877 
Firms  49,394 49,358 47,517 47,517 39,809 39,764 38,573 38,573 
Note: Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Ω Average for each 2-digit sector except IQR which is the inter-quartile range for the 2-digit sector. 
All models include firm, sector (2-digit), time and provincial fixed effects. 
Source: authors’ calculations.  
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Table 6b: Determinants of switching—4-digit definition 
  Switch IN  Switch OUT 
Firm-specific          
Productivity 0.001**  0.001 -0.001    0.001*  0.0002  0.001  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)  
Rank  productivity     0.052***     -0.009 
     (0.008)     (0.009) 
lnK/L  -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004**  -0.005**  -0.005**  -0.005** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size 0.011***  0.010***  0.009***  0.005*  -0.011***  -0.010***  -0.011***  -0.011*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
State-owned  0.016 0.034**  0.031**  0.032**  0.006 0.015 0.013 0.012 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Foreign-owned 0.087*  0.075*  0.058  0.059  0.010  -0.005  -0.015  -0.017 
  (0.046) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.062) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Multi-product 0.006  0.004 0.006 0.004 -0.014**  -0.017***  -0.021***  -0.020*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Sector-specific          
Productivity
Ω   0.053***  0.054***    0.057***  0.053***   
   (0.007)  (0.008)    (0.007)  (0.008)   
IQR productivity
Ω     -0.018***     0.004** 
     (0.004)     (0.001) 
lnK/L
Ω  -0.020  -0.035**  -0.030**   0.014  0.024*  0.021 
   (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)   (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Size
 Ω  0.070***  0.105***  0.129***   0.017*  0.019**  0.024*** 
   (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)   (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
CR
 Ω    -0.227*** -0.137*** -0.114***   0.003  -0.002  -0.027 
   (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.036)   (0.034)  (0.036)  (0.035) 
FR
 Ω    -0.384*** -0.353*** -0.377***   -0.472*** -0.455*** -0.467*** 
   (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)   (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
SR
 Ω    -0.209*** -0.224*** -0.231***   -0.085*** -0.130*** -0.126*** 
   (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.024)   (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Tariff level
Ω    -0.229***  -0.217***    0.298***  0.328*** 
    (0.027)  (0.026)    (0.049)  (0.048) 
Export intensity
Ω    0.003  0.001    -0.026***  -0.027*** 
    (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.003) 
Observations  136,235 132,193 124,356 124,356 115,189 111,736 104,994 104,994 
Firms  49,409 48,412 46,404 46,404 39,820 39,124 37,838 37,838 
Note: Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Ω Average for each 4-digit sector except IQR which is the inter-quartile range for the 4-digit sector. 
All models include firm, sector (4-digit), time and provincial fixed effects. 
Source: authors’ calculations.  
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Table 7: Determinants of entry and exit—2-digit definition of sector level variables 
  Entry Exit 
Firm-specific          
Productivity  -0.002 -0.007**  -0.006**    -0.001 0.0005  0.002   
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Rank  productivity     -0.217***     -0.008 
     (0.007)     (0.005) 
lnK/L 0.019***  0.019***  0.019***  0.013***  0.0003  0.0003  0.0004  0.0001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size  -0.042*** -0.042**  -0.042*** -0.032*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
State-owned  -0.071*** -0.070*** -0.065*** -0.074*** 0.049***  0.048***  0.046***  0.046*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Foreign-owned -0.154*** -0.153*** -0.149***  -0.150***  0.030 0.030 0.029 0.028 
  (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Multi-product  0.008*  0.008*  0.007 0.015***  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Sector-specific          
Productivity
Ω   0.033***  0.033***    -0.013*  -0.029***   
   (0.010)  (0.010)    (0.007)  (0.008)   
IQR productivity
Ω     -0.020**     0.011 
     (0.010)     (0.007) 
lnK/L
Ω    0.010 0.021 0.031   0.064***  0.025*  0.020 
   (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.019)   (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Size
 Ω  0.017  0.020*  -0.007   -0.005  -0.003  -0.007 
   (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)   (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
CR
 Ω   0.139***  0.086  0.109**   0.027  0.086**  0.063 
   (0.051)  (0.056)  (0.055)   (0.040)  (0.043)  (0.042) 
FR
 Ω    -0.263*** -0.248*** -0.253***   0.069**  0.051  0.070** 
   (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.041)   (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
SR
 Ω   -0.044  -0.047  -0.057*   0.047*  0.051*  0.061** 
   (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.032)   (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.025) 
Tariff level
Ω    -0.071***  -0.072***    0.020  0.020 
    (0.022)  (0.022)    (0.015)  (0.015) 
Export intensity
Ω    -0.002  -0.003    -0.003  -0.002 
    (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.003)  (0.003) 
Observations  146,027 145,775 138,345 138,345 146,027 145,775 138,345 138,345 
Firms  50,794 50,753 49,046 49,046 50,794 50,753 49,046 49,046 
Note: See Table 6a. 
Source: authors’ calculations.  
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Table 8: Determinants of switching—robustness checks 






































































































































































































































































































































































































Observations 68,086 101,964  114,993  121,248  124,356  94760  61,059 84,622 96,497 102,083  104,994  79,034 
Firms  19,158 40,779 44,951 45,280 46,404 42326  17,812 32,572 36,465 36,745 37,838 34,285 
Note: See Table 6a and 6b depending on level of aggregation. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 